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1. Introduction 
The recent global financial crisis has highlighted the importance of liquidity for the well-
functioning of financial markets. It is now well understood that a decline or, at worst, 
evaporation of liquidity may cause large falls in asset prices that are not justified by their 
fundamentals. It may also cause the initialization of a downward spiral in asset prices, 
amplified by fire sales and deleveraging to meet margin calls and higher haircuts (see 
Brunnermeier, 2009, and Gorton and Metrick, 2010b). Such feedback mechanisms can 
eventually pose a major threat to the stability of the financial system (Pedersen, 2009). 
Liquidity plays a crucial role both at the macro level and at the micro level. Macro-liquidity 
mainly refers to the money supply provision by central banks and the availability of funds for 
financial markets’ participants, such as financial intermediaries. Micro-liquidity mainly refers 
to the trading conditions of individual assets, namely the cost, speed, volume and price 
impact of transforming cash into financial assets and vice versa (Chordia, Sarkar and 
Subrahmanyam, 2005). The aim of this study is to examine the potential link between 
liquidity at a macro and a micro-level by evaluating the response of liquidity-sorted stock 
portfolios’ returns to macro-liquidity shocks on the Bank of England (BoE) Monetary Policy 
Committee’s (MPC) meeting days over the period June 1999- December 2009. 
Central banks are considered to be the primary suppliers of funds in the economic 
system. Managing inflation expectations, enhancing growth and employment prospects as 
well as preserving the stability of the financial system are typically the mandates of central 
bank authorities. To this end, they possess a set of monetary policy tools for managing 
macro-liquidity. The policy rate they determine is considered to be the benchmark for the 
term structure of interest rates. This is particularly true for the short-end of the yield curve 
(Kuttner, 2001). Moreover, the terms of liquidity provision to financial intermediaries affect 
to a great extent the broad money supply in the economy. It has been well documented how 
the credit channel of the monetary policy transmission mechanism affects firms’ operations 
and the entire economy as a result (see inter alia Fazzari, Hubbard and Petersen, 1988, 
Bernanke and Gertler, 1989, Bernanke and Blinder, 1992, and Bernanke and Gertler, 1995). 
Crucially for the focus of our study, the pivotal role of intermediaries in the modern financial 
system also implies that macro-liquidity shocks induced by changes in the monetary policy 
4 
 
stance of central banks can be transmitted through the entire intermediation chain, eventually 
affecting institutional and individual investors in the marketplace.1 
Most obviously, the interbank market is crucially affected by monetary policy decisions; 
these are reflected in LIBOR fluctuations that influence the flow of funds among major 
intermediaries and determine the value of their proprietary portfolio of assets and agreements 
as well as the borrowing ability of dealers (see Garcia, 1989, for an account of the monetary 
policy tools for liquidity provision to intermediaries). As a result, these intermediaries may 
have to rebalance their own portfolios and modify their risk exposure and degree of leverage 
to meet regulatory requirements and remain solvent. Adrian and Shin (2010a) convincingly 
demonstrate that investment banks had been actively managing their leverage as a response to 
changes in their balance sheets’ size. Reinforcing this argument, Kashyap and Stein (2000) 
provide evidence that the transmission of liquidity shocks via banks depends, in the first 
place, on the composition and quality of their own balance sheets. Gromb and Vayanos 
(2002) show that shifts in market liquidity can lead to significant losses in the positions of 
financially constrained intermediaries, who in turn may exacerbate asset prices’ volatility and 
become unable to exploit arbitrage opportunities. Such liquidity shocks may actually cause 
cross-market contagion effects (Gromb and Vayanos, 2009). 
At the same time, intermediaries pass on to their institutional or individual clients these 
new terms of funds’ exchange by modifying their lending standards as well as their margin 
requirements or call rates, which in turn may cause major shifts in the composition of these 
clients’ portfolios and the trading conditions for the corresponding financial assets. 
Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) model the interaction between the availability of funds for 
traders and microstructure liquidity in asset markets. Fortune (2000) explains the mechanics 
of margin lending and demonstrates the close relationship between the broker call money rate 
and the Fed Funds rate. In a recent study related to ours, Nyborg and Ostberg (2010) analyze 
the various processes through which banks attempt to recover liquidity (collectively termed 
“liquidity pull-back”) when they face tighter funding conditions. Gromb and Vayanos (2010) 
model how the level of capital available to financially constrained intermediaries affects 
market liquidity. In sum, a shift in the quantity of available funds and the price of liquidity at 
the macro-level due to monetary policy actions can be spread along the intermediation chain, 
reaching investors and traders by altering their funding conditions and investment decisions; 
this alteration will be eventually manifested through shifts in microstructure liquidity. 
                                                            
1 Adrian and Shin (2010b) provide a detailed description of the long intermediation chain 
characterizing a modern financial system and the transmission of liquidity shocks across its links. 
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There is an extensive literature documenting the impact of monetary policy shocks on 
stock returns using various approaches for the identification of these shocks. Jensen and 
Johnson (1995) suggested a dummy variable approach to distinguish between expansionary 
and contractionary monetary policy regimes. Thorbecke (1997) put forward a VAR approach 
to identify such shocks and computed the corresponding impulse responses of stock returns, 
while Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) used the methodology suggested by Kuttner (2001) to 
extract a measure of “surprise” rate changes from futures contracts written on the Fed Funds 
rate.2 The latter approach has become quite popular in the literature, because these futures 
contracts naturally embed market participants’ expectations in a very successful way (see 
Gurkaynak, Sack and Swanson, 2007, for a comparison of various market instruments’ 
forecasting ability over future monetary policy), and hence one-day changes in their prices 
more cleanly isolate the unanticipated element of policy actions (shock). Moreover, as 
Piazzesi and Swanson (2008) note, measuring shocks through one-day futures price changes 
is a robust approach because low-frequency risk premia that are potentially incorporated in 
futures prices are effectively “differenced out”.   
This event study methodology has been also applied to international stock markets (see 
Wongswan, 2009 and Bredin, Hyde, Nitzsche and O’Reilly, 2009) as well as bond markets 
(see Bredin, Hyde and O’Reilly, 2010). For the UK market, which is the focus of our study, 
Bredin, Hyde, Nitzsche and O’ Reilly (2007) have examined along the same lines the impact 
of anticipated and unanticipated interest rate changes on FTSE and sectoral returns on 
meeting days of the BoE’s MPC. Similar is the approach of Gregoriou, Kontonikas, 
MacDonald and Montagnoli (2009) for a more recent period. For the UK, however, there are 
no futures market instruments that track the BoE’s policy rate (the two week repo rate). The 
closest substitute that these studies employ is the 3-month Sterling LIBOR futures contract 
traded on LIFFE. This is one of the instruments used by BoE to gauge market expectations 
regarding future interest rates (Brooke, Cooper and Scholtes, 2000, Joyce, Relleen and 
Sorensen, 2008). Since these futures contracts are actually written on LIBOR, we argue that 
the changes of their prices on MPC meetings days can be more broadly considered as macro-
liquidity shocks initiated by the central bank actions (or inactions) rather than being narrowly 
                                                            
2 Fleming and Remolona (1997), Lobo (2002), Piazzesi (2005) and Laopodis (2006) have also 
documented the impact of monetary policy shocks on stock and bond market returns. A series of other 
studies have examined this issue using the cross-section of stock returns; Jensen, Johnson and Mercer 
(1997), Guo (2004), Maio and Tavares (2007) studied the response of size and value portfolios’ 
returns, while Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2004) and Basistha and Kurov (2008) utilized portfolios of 
financially constrained stocks. 
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defined as monetary policy shocks. This is especially true because the LIBOR is not 
necessarily equal to the BoE’s policy rate; their spread, equivalent to the LIBOR-OIS spread 
in the US, is actually time-varying and conveys significant information for the interbank 
market conditions in periods of liquidity draughts (Gorton and Metrick, 2010a,b). 
To examine the potential link between macro- and micro-liquidity, we utilize this event 
study methodology to assess the impact of macro-liquidity shocks on the returns of stock 
portfolios that have been formed on the basis of a series of liquidity measures. Even though 
traditional asset pricing models assume perfect capital markets, it is now well understood that 
micro-structure liquidity is an important source of market frictions and it can have first-order 
effects on asset prices (see the seminal studies of Amihud and Mendelson, 1980, 1986a, 
1986b). Most importantly, there is sufficient evidence that micro-structure liquidity can be 
regarded as a risk factor leading to substantial risk premia in the cross-section of stock returns 
(Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003; Acharya and Pedersen, 2005). Motivated by this evidence, we 
argue that macro-liquidity shocks, to the extent that they affect the microstructure liquidity 
conditions in the stock market, may also have a differential impact on the cross-section of 
liquidity-sorted portfolios’ returns. Stocks with different microstructure characteristics, and 
hence different exposure to micro-liquidity risk, may be differently affected by a common 
macro-liquidity shock. 
Despite the considerable attention that micro-liquidity measurement has attracted in prior 
literature, it remains an elusive concept (Amihud, 2002; Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003). This 
feature has led to the emergence of a vast literature proposing a series of measures capturing 
the four dimensions of liquidity (trading cost, quantity, speed and price impact). Our aim is to 
provide comprehensive evidence on the examined link, and hence we construct and utilize 
stock portfolios on the basis of six measures, covering every dimension of micro-liquidity. In 
particular, we utilize the universe of stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange (LSE) 
during the period 1999-2009 and we construct decile portfolios by ranking them according to 
their bid-ask spread (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986a), relative spread (Amihud and 
Mendelson, 1986b, Loderer and Roth, 2005), turnover rate (Datar, Naik and Radcliffe, 1998, 
Chordia, Subrahmanyam, Anshuman, 2001), trading volume (Brennan, Chordia and 
Subrahmanyam, 1998), Return-to-Volume (RtoV) price impact ratio (Amihud, 2002) and 
Return-to-Turnover Rate (RtoTR) price impact ratio (Florackis, Gregoriou and Kostakis, 
2009). 
The study most related to ours is the recent contribution by Nyborg and Ostberg (2010). 
They examine the link between liquidity in the interbank market and trading conditions in the 
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US stock market utilizing a long time series of daily observations. In particular, they examine 
whether the LIBOR-OIS spread affects differentially the trading volume and the returns in 
the cross-section of liquidity-sorted portfolios; they use Amihud’s (2002) RtoV measure to 
rank stocks and construct decile portfolios.3 In the same spirit, Fernandez- Amador, Gachter, 
Larch and Peter (2010) use a VAR framework to examine the impact of ECB monetary 
policy stance on the micro-liquidity of three major Eurozone markets. Instead, our focus is 
mainly on the response of liquidity-sorted portfolios in terms of returns using a plethora of 
measures. Our study is also related to the seminal paper of Chordia, Sarkar and 
Subrahmanyam (2005), who were the first to establish a link between macro and micro-
liquidity. They estimated VAR systems to calculate impulse responses of a series of 
microstructure features and returns in the stock and bond market to unanticipated changes in 
the Fed Funds rate, net borrowed returns, equity and bond mutual fund flows. Our approach 
to utilize the cross-section of liquidity-sorted portfolios, rather than broad stock market or 
sectoral indices can shed more light to this link.  
Previewing our empirical results we highlight the following main findings. First, there 
has been a structural break in the relationship between macro-liquidity shocks and liquidity-
sorted portfolio returns during the recent crisis period. Failing to account for this break, one 
would erroneously conclude that macro-liquidity shocks have no effect on returns. Second, 
these shocks are transmitted to the cross-section of liquidity-sorted portfolios but in a 
differential manner between the most liquid and the most illiquid portfolios. Interestingly, the 
effect is much more statistically and economically significant for the most liquid portfolios. 
Third, the commonly documented inverse relationship between interest rate surprises and 
returns before the crisis has reversed its sign during the crisis. Interest rate cuts during the 
crisis not only failed to boost returns in the short-run, but they actually led liquid stocks to 
lower prices, because these were perceived by stock market participants as a signal of a worse 
economic outlook by the Bank of England. 
Our study is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the employed dataset and 
discusses various methodological issues. Section 3 contains the benchmark results, examining 
the impact of macro-liquidity shocks on liquidity-sorted stock portfolios. Section 4 contains a 
                                                            
3 The LIBOR-OIS spread is widely accepted as “a barometer of fears of bank insolvency” in the 
words of Alan Greenspan (see Thornton, 2009 and Gorton and Metrick, 2010a for an analysis of its 
features). Following Nyborg and Ostberg (2010), we also consider daily changes in the LIBOR-BoE 
base rate spread on MPC meeting days as an alternative measure of macro-liquidity shocks, 
complementing our benchmark results based on shocks implied by the LIBOR futures contracts. 
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series of robustness tests, utilizing also an alternative measure of liquidity shock, while 
Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Data and Methodology 
In line with the methodology suggested by Kuttner (2001), we use data from interest rate 
futures to extract macro-liquidity shocks on BoE’s MPC meeting days. Following Fed’s 
practice, MPC meeting days’ schedule has become publicly known since June 1997.4 As 
mentioned in the Introduction, there is no futures contract written on BoE’s policy rate, the 
two-week repo rate. The most appropriate substitute is the short sterling futures contract that 
settles on the 3-month British Bankers’ Association (BBA) London Interbank Offer Rate 
(LIBOR) prevailing at 11:00 on the last trading day (third Wednesday of the delivery month). 
The settlement price is 100 minus the BBA LIBOR rounded to three decimal places. 
Contracts are standardised and traded between members of the London International 
Financial Futures and Options Exchange (LIFFE). This futures contract is widely used to 
hedge against and speculate on future interest rate movements, and hence it is well regarded 
to accurately embed market expectations (see Brook et al., 2000, and Bredin et al., 2007). 
Therefore, the unanticipated (unexpected) interest rate shock, udiΔ , is defined as the change in 
the implied 3-month LIBOR rate on the MPC meeting day, d, relative to the previous day, d-
1, i.e.: 
, , 1
u
d m d m di f f −Δ = −                               (1) 
where ,m df  is the implied interest rate, 100 minus the LIFFE futures contract price, extracted 
by the corresponding contract with delivery month m nearest to the MPC meeting day d.5 The 
sample period under investigation is June 1999-December 2009, a total of 128 MPC 
meetings.6 Moreover, we define the anticipated (expected) change in interest rate, ediΔ , as the 
actual change in the 3-month LIBOR rate minus the unanticipated change: 
                                                            
4 The list of meetings and decisions is available at http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy. 
5 No adjustment is necessary for the number of days remaining in the month as in the US studies, 
because unlike the futures on the Fed funds rate whose settlement is based on the average Fed funds 
rate of the last month in the futures’ life, in the UK the settlement of the 3-month LIBOR futures is 
based on the corresponding LIBOR of the last trading day.  
6 We start our event study analysis from June 1999 because LIBOR futures contracts did not settle on 
a monthly basis before that date; only contracts with quarterly delivery existed. The lack of 
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e u
d d di i iΔ = Δ −Δ                                                      (2) 
For the construction of liquidity-sorted portfolios, we consider an initial sample that 
consists of all common stocks listed on the London Stock Exchange for the period from May 
1999 to December 2009. Our analysis covers both presently listed and dead stocks (i.e. stocks 
of firms that were de-listed at some point during the sample period), and hence our dataset is 
free of any potential survivorship bias. We minimize the impact of outliers by excluding 
stocks with a very low market value or a temporary listing period. Moreover, we also exclude 
stocks with less than 15 trading days in each month. Finally, following conventional practice 
in UK stock market studies (see e.g. Fletcher and Kihanda, 2005), we exclude unit trusts, 
investment trusts and ADRs. Our final dataset comprises of an average of 933 stocks in each 
month.  
We obtain data from Thomson DataStream and construct, on a daily basis, a series of 
micro-structure measures, namely bid-ask spread, relative spread, turnover, volume, return to 
volume and return to turnover, which capture different dimensions of liquidity (i.e. trading 
cost, trading quantity, trading speed and price-impact). We define bid-ask spread as the 
pound difference between the ask price quoted (PA) and the bid price offered (PB) at the 
close of the market. Relative spread is the bid-ask spread divided by the mid-price, where the 
mid-price is given by (PA+PB)/2. Turnover is the ratio of number of shares traded on a day 
to the number of shares outstanding on that day. Volume is measured as the total value (in 
sterling pounds) of all shares traded for a stock on a particular day. Return-to-Volume (RtoV) 
represents the price impact ratio for each stock and is calculated as the monthly average ratio 
of the absolute daily return to the corresponding pound trading volume. Formally, this is 
given by: 
 
1
| |1 imD imd
im
dim imd
RRtoV
D V=
= ∑                  (3) 
where Rimd and Vimd are, respectively, the return and monetary volume of stock i on day d at 
month m and Dim is the number of valid observation days in month m for stock i. Finally, 
Return-to-Turnover Rate (RtoTR) is an alternative price impact ratio for each stock and is 
                                                                                                                                                                                        
correspondence in frequencies between the event (MPC monthly meetings) and the instrument’s 
settlement may lead to biased estimates of the shock before June 1999. 
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calculated as the monthly average ratio of the absolute daily return to the corresponding 
turnover rate.7 This is given by: 
                                      
1
1 imD imd
im
dim imd
R
RtoTR
D TR=
= ∑       (4) 
where imdTR  is the Turnover Rate of stock i at day d, while imD  and imdR  are as previously 
defined. 
For each of these liquidity measures, we sort listed stocks on a monthly basis and we 
construct decile portfolios (P1 to P10). Portfolio 1 (P1) contains the most liquid stocks while 
Portfolio 10 (P10) contains the most illiquid stocks. Portfolios are rebalanced on a monthly 
basis to incorporate the latest available information. Since we are interested in the portfolios’ 
return response due to a macro-liquidity shock on the MPC meeting days, we calculate 
(daily) value-weighted decile portfolio returns on every meeting day d of month m for each 
micro-liquidity measure; these decile portfolios have been constructed on the basis of the 
liquidity measures’ values at the end of month m-1, i.e. the latest publicly available 
information. Panel A of Table 1 contains descriptive statistics for the returns of the most 
liquid and most illiquid portfolios, respectively, on the MPC meeting days. Panel B presents 
the corresponding pairwise correlation coefficients of the portfolios’ returns. As expected, 
these daily returns are highly correlated, confirming that there is a degree commonality 
among these popular liquidity measures. However, these correlations are less than perfect for 
most of the cases, especially for the most illiquid portfolios, showing that each measure 
captures different elements of micro-liquidity. This finding confirms that it is worth 
considering all these measures in an attempt to provide comprehensive evidence on the 
response of micro-liquidity sorted portfolios’ returns to macro-liquidity shocks.   
 
[Table 1 about here] 
 
3. Empirical results 
                                                            
7 The latter price impact ratio is motivated by the potential cross-sectional size bias that Amihud’s 
RtoV ratio encompasses. In particular, since trading volume, appearing in the denominator of this 
ratio, is highly correlated with stocks’ market value, ranking stocks according to RtoV is almost 
identical to ranking them according to their capitalization (see Florackis, Gregoriou and Kostakis, 
2009 for a more detailed analysis). On the other hand, RtoTR is not expected to exhibit a size pattern, 
because turnover rates are not strongly correlated with market values. 
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The starting point of our analysis is to examine, for the sample period considered, the 
relationship between expected and unexpected interest rate changes and stock returns on the 
BoE MPC meeting days using the portfolios constructed on the basis of a series of micro-
liquidity measures. To this end, the benchmark specification we employ is: 
,
e e u u
p d d d dr i i eα β β= + Δ + Δ +             (5) 
where ,p dr  is the return of the liquidity portfolio p on the meeting day d. Panel A of Table 2 
reports the coefficients of model (5) for each liquidity measure considered by pooling 
information from all ten portfolios. More specifically, these are pooled least squares panel 
estimates, where the cross sectional units are the ten liquidity-sorted portfolios. The main 
conclusion from these results is that neither anticipated nor unanticipated interest rate 
changes affect portfolio returns on MPC meeting days, regardless of the liquidity measure 
that has been used to sort stocks. Moreover, the explanatory power of these regressions is 
almost negligible. The only exception is the case where bid-ask spread is considered as a 
liquidity measure; in this case, the adjusted R2 is 3%, but the coefficient of the surprise 
liquidity shock has a puzzling positive sign. In sum, the reported results using the cross-
section of liquidity-sorted portfolios for the period June 1999- December 2009 are in sharp 
contrast to the evidence provided in prior studies (e.g. Bernanke and Kuttner, 2005 for the US 
and Bredin et al., 2007 for the UK market). 
[Table 2 about here] 
A casual inspection of the data motivates us to examine whether structural instability lies 
behind this puzzling finding. In particular, the common perception and finding of previous 
studies that stock prices rise due to a larger than expected decrease in interest rates was not 
confirmed during the recent crisis period. As a characteristic example, while the unexpected 
interest rate decrease, as implied by the futures contract on the 3-month LIBOR, was an 
astonishing 0.4% on the MPC meeting of 6th November 2008, the FTSE All Share index 
plummeted by 5.53% on that day.8 Similarly, the unexpected, relative to market expectations, 
interest rate decrease of 0.1% on the meeting of 8th October 2008 was associated with a FTSE 
All Share drop of 4.98%. This puzzling phenomenon has attracted considerable attention in 
                                                            
8 It is worth noting that the magnitude of this unanticipated decrease is so big because the market was 
actually expecting an increase in LIBOR on that meeting day. Moreover, the BoE cut its policy rate 
by a historical record of 1.5%. Hence, it is even more intriguing that the stock market collapsed in the 
face of the largest unexpected interest rate cut in record. 
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the financial press; a plausible interpretation is that surprising the market during the crisis by 
reducing rates more than expected was perceived as a signal for an even bleaker economic 
outlook by the central bank.9 Hence, interest rate decreases, instead of boosting stock returns 
as previously thought, actually signalled worse economic conditions to the investment 
community and led stock prices to lower levels. On the other hand, rising interest rates could 
have been regarded as good news, indicating the end of the crisis.10 
The structural instability argument was formally tested using standard Chow-type tests as 
well as the Quandt-Andrews unknown breakpoints test (Quandt, 1960, and Andrews, 1993). 
In particular, the regressions that we estimated using various portfolio returns’ time series 
exhibited a structural break at the beginning of the crisis period, i.e. August- September 2007, 
symbolically coinciding with the bank run on Northern Rock. Motivated by this evidence and 
the discussion in Brunnermeier (2009), we introduce a crisis period dummy that spans the 
period from August 2007 till December 2009.11 This dummy variable is interacted with the 
explanatory variables of our benchmark specification in (5), leading to the following model 
for the MPC meeting day returns of each portfolio: 
 
, 1 2( ) ( )
e e u u
p d d d dr DCrisis i DCrisis i eα β δ β δ= + + Δ + + Δ +      (6)   
where DCrisis  stands for the crisis period dummy variable; it takes the value 1 from August 
2007 onwards and 0 otherwise. 
Panel B of Table 2 contains the pooled least squares panel estimates of model (6) for 
each measure considered in this study, utilizing cross-sectional information from all ten 
portfolios. This simple way of capturing structural instability in the liquidity shocks-portfolio 
returns relationship leads to a series of highly important findings. Firstly, both expected and 
unexpected interest rate changes can help explain daily returns in the cross-section of 
liquidity portfolios on BoE MPC meetings once the effect of the crisis on the relationship is 
taken into account. The adjusted R2 of this model can be as high as 11% in case the bid-ask 
spread is utilized as a measure of micro-liquidity. Secondly, the inverse relationship between 
unanticipated interest rate shocks and portfolio returns is documented for the period before 
the crisis, confirming the evidence provided by earlier studies and, for the first time in the 
literature, extending this finding for the case of liquidity-sorted portfolios. This inverse 
                                                            
9 Buttonwood also utilizes this line of argumentation in “Another paradox of thrift”, The Economist, 
18th September 2010. 
10 See, for example, “Why rising rates is good news”, Financial Times, 14th December 2010. 
11 For robustness, in Section 4 we alternatively characterize a shorter time period as the crisis period.   
13 
 
relationship is true even for anticipated interest rate changes, with the exception of trading 
volume-sorted portfolios, contradicting the hypothesis that these anticipated changes would 
have been already incorporated in stock prices and that they should not matter. 
Most importantly, we emphatically document that the shocks-liquidity portfolio returns’ 
relationship reverses its sign during the crisis period. In particularly, it turns into a positive 
relationship that is highly significant, statistically as well as economically, for both expected 
and unexpected changes. In other words, an unexpected (or expected) decrease in the 3-
month LIBOR led to a negative portfolio return response during the crisis period, while it 
would have yielded a positive return before the crisis. The magnitude of the return responses 
is also noteworthy; for every measure considered, the positive response to the shock during 
the crisis was almost twice greater than the negative response (in absolute value) documented 
before the crisis. In general, the magnitude of the responses estimated by model (6) is much 
more economically significant than the ones yielded by model (5), which does not consider 
the crisis effect. This evidence also confirms the conjecture that considering liquidity-sorted 
portfolio rather than aggregate sectoral indices, could yield more intriguing results regarding 
the shocks-returns relationship.  
The previous set of results was based on pooling information from all ten portfolios we 
constructed for each micro-liquidity measure. To dissect this evidence, the next step of our 
analysis is to examine the shocks-returns relationship in the extreme decile portfolios. Table 3 
contains the estimated coefficients from model (5) applied to the most liquid and most 
illiquid portfolio returns, respectively. As it was the case with pooled information, no 
significant relationship for neither of the two portfolios is reported if one does not take into 
account the crisis effect. Apart from statistical significance, the point estimates of the 
coefficients do not lead to any meaningful conclusion either. Interestingly, model (5) has no 
explanatory power for the returns of the most illiquid portfolio, while this is slightly 
improved for the most liquid portfolio’s returns. These results hold for all six sorting 
measures considered. 
[Table 3 about here] 
Motivated by the evidence on the effect of crisis on the shocks-returns relationship in the 
cross-section of portfolios’ returns, we also estimate model (6) for the most liquid and most 
illiquid portfolio’s respectively. Panel A of Table 4 contains the estimates corresponding to 
each of the micro-liquidity measures we have utilized. The inclusion of the crisis slope 
dummy variable has a drastic effect on the obtained results. We document that the most liquid 
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portfolio’s returns behave dramatically differently from those of the most illiquid portfolio. In 
particular, model (6) can explain to a large extent the behaviour of the most liquid portfolio’s 
returns on MPC meeting days, while it fails to do so for the most illiquid portfolio’s returns. 
While the adjusted R2 is negligible for the most illiquid portfolio’s returns regardless of the 
sorting measure considered, it is quite high for the most liquid portfolio’s daily returns, 
reaching the level of 22% for the case of turnover rate. 
[Table 4 about here] 
Apart from the differential explanatory power that model (6) contains for liquid versus 
illiquid portfolios’ returns, it also highlights the differential response of these returns to 
macro-liquidity innovations, as these are measured relative to market expectations embedded 
in the 3-month LIBOR futures contract. In particular, the introduction of the crisis slope 
dummy variable helps recover again the inverse relationship between interest rate shocks and 
returns prior to the crisis period and emphatically illustrates the reversal of this sign during 
the recent financial crisis; this is true for the most liquid portfolio’s returns and it holds for all 
measures examined. On the other hand, the most illiquid portfolio’s returns do not seem to 
exhibit any kind of relationship to interest rate shocks, neither before nor during the crisis 
period. This finding is in line with the extensive literature documenting that liquid stocks 
behave differently from illiquid stocks in terms of premia and risk exposure. It also and 
illustrates that macro-liquidity shocks is a fundamental factor to which these portfolios are 
exposed in a differential manner. 
A potential source of concern for an event study analysis of portfolio returns is that the 
estimated coefficients may be distorted by large outliers. It is certain that specific news or 
other shocks occurring on the specific meeting days that we examine may also cause stock 
prices to move. To take into account the potential effect of large outliers on the estimated 
coefficients, we follow Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) and re-estimate model (6) after 
controlling for large outliers. In particular, instead of crudely excluding observations from 
our sample, we introduce intercept dummies when the residuals from the no-breaks fitted 
model take values in excess of 2.6 standard errors (i.e. 1% level of significance).12 
Panel B of Table 4 contains the estimated coefficients for model (6) after controlling for 
large outliers. This control considerably increases the explanatory power of the model for 
                                                            
12 As a further robustness check, we re-estimate model (6) in Section 4 after controlling for other 
variables, such as exchange rate movements and US stock returns that may exert a systematic effect 
on these portfolio’s returns (see Section 4.2). 
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both the liquid and the illiquid portfolios. Most importantly, the sign and the statistical 
significance of the coefficients for the most liquid portfolio’s returns remain intact for every 
measure considered. Though the magnitude of the positive returns’ response to shocks during 
the crisis period is slightly reduced in some cases, the previous conclusions regarding the 
economic significance and interpretation of this response carry through. On the other hand, 
almost no response coefficient is statistically significant before or during the crisis for the 
most illiquid portfolio’s returns; the reported higher explanatory power is derived almost 
exclusively from the intercept dummies introduced to control for large outliers, which have 
been mainly detected during the crisis period.13 The main conclusion arising from these 
results is that the nature of response to interest rate shocks is very different in the cross-
section of liquidity-sorted portfolios. In other words, macro-liquidity shocks are transmitted 
in a differential manner to stocks with different micro-liquidity characteristics. This finding 
establishes the conjectured link between macro- and micro-liquidity. 
To examine further this link, we explicitly test whether this differential response in the 
cross-section of liquidity-sorted portfolios is statistically significant. Following the preceding 
analysis we re-estimate models (5) and (6) using as the dependent variable the differential 
return (spread) between the most liquid and the most illiquid portfolio for each measure we 
have utilized in this study. Table 5 presents the results corresponding to the case where no 
dummy variable is utilized. As expected, no response coefficient is found to be statistically 
significant and only a very small portion of the variation in the returns’ spread can be 
explained by model (5). This finding indicates again that failing to account for the break and 
sign reversal in the shocks-returns’ relationship during the crisis period would lead to 
completely erroneous conclusions regarding its nature. 
[Table 5 about here] 
Panel A of Table 6 presents the estimated response coefficients for the liquid-illiquid 
portfolio spread return after accounting for the slope break in the examined relationship 
(model 6). Panel B contains the corresponding estimates once we control for large outliers in 
each case. The explanatory power of these regressions is quite high. Though daily returns are 
quite noisy by nature, these macro-liquidity shocks can explain up to 24% of the most liquid-
most illiquid portfolio spread return on MPC meeting days; once we control for large outliers, 
up to 44% of this variation can be attributed to these shocks. This finding highlights the 
                                                            
13 The days of the intercept dummies for each case are omitted for ease of illustration but are readily 
available upon request. 
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fundamental importance of macro-liquidity, confirming that such shocks are directly 
transmitted to stock prices via the channels we described in the Introduction. 
[Table 6 about here] 
The sign and the magnitude of the spread returns’ response to these shocks is of great 
interest too. We document across the various measures we examine that, before the crisis, an 
inverse relationship between interest rate shocks and the liquid-illiquid spread was holding. 
With the exception of the bid-ask spread and partly the RtoTR ratio, this inverse relationship 
is statistically significant. The magnitude of this response is economically significant too. 
This inverse relationship implies that, before the crisis period, an adverse macro-liquidity 
shock (i.e. increase in interest rates) resulted in liquid stock prices’ fall. Along the same lines, 
a positive shock of macro-liquidity expansion (i.e. decrease in interest rates) was boosting 
liquid stocks’ returns. This finding indicates that macro-liquidity expansion improved further 
micro-liquidity conditions for liquid stocks and investors were ready to pay higher prices to 
hold them. A plausible interpretation is that improved micro-liquidity conditions made these 
liquid stocks even closer substitutes to other highly liquid instruments (e.g. short-term 
commercial or government paper), and hence the corresponding liquidity premium required 
by investors was reduced, boosting their prices. On the other hand, the most illiquid stocks’ 
returns were largely unaffected by either expansionary or contractionary macro-liquidity 
shocks; the investors did not seem to modify the premium they required to hold them. These 
results remain intact when we take into account the potential effect of large outliers in Panel 
B of Table 6.  
The inverse relationship between the most liquid stocks’ returns and macro-liquidity 
shocks has not just ceased to hold during the crisis period; its sign has been actually reversed. 
In other words, during the crisis period, a decrease in interest rates on BoE MPC meeting 
days was actually associated with lower returns for the most liquid stocks. The signalling 
mechanism we mentioned above offers a plausible explanation for this finding. Interest rate 
cuts during the crisis were regarded to signal worse prospects for the financial system and the 
macroeconomy, and hence investors fled the stock market, liquidating their positions to hoard 
cash or cash-like instruments, reduce their risk exposure or meet margin calls. This flight to 
liquidity or safety (Longstaff, 2004) caused a massive sell off, primarily for the relatively 
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more liquid stocks which were easier to liquidate.14 During these stressed economic and 
financial conditions the most liquid stocks ceased to be regarded close substitutes to cash-like 
instruments, the required premia were increased, and hence their prices were heavily 
penalized. 
On the other hand, the most illiquid stocks were not affected by interest rate shocks 
during the crisis period, except when the bid-ask and the relative spread are employed for 
micro-liquidity measurement. An interpretation of this result is that changes in the macro-
liquidity conditions did not affect the most illiquid stocks, which were already penalized with 
a high premium required by investors to hold them. This differential return response between 
the most liquid and most illiquid stocks is statistically significant at levels lower than 1% 
across all measures considered. The magnitude of this differential response is overwhelming, 
underlining the importance of the signalling mechanism of interest rate shocks for the most 
liquid stocks. As Panel B of Table 6 shows, these results carry through even when we control 
for large outliers, though the magnitude of the responses’ differential is slightly reduced in 
some of the cases. 
To illustrate the reversal of the shocks-returns relationship during the crisis for the most 
liquid portfolio and its differential response relative to the most illiquid via an example, we 
resort again to the meeting of 6th November 2008 when the unanticipated interest rate 
decrease took its largest value (0.4%). While this should have normally boosted stock prices, 
the FTSE All Share index actually fell by 5.53% and the most liquid portfolio exhibited a 
negative return of 10.14% (Turnover rate), 5.94% (Volume), 5.73% (RtoV), 5.69% (Relative 
spread), 5.55% (Bid-Ask spread), 4.95% (RtoTR). On the other hand, the most illiquid 
portfolios were not affected to a great extent by this huge shock; for example, the most 
negative return among the most illiquid portfolios was just 1.65% for the case of relative 
spread. 
 
4. Robustness checks  
4.1. Alternative definition of the crisis period 
                                                            
14 This conjecture is consistent with the evidence in Nyborg and Ostberg (2010), according to which a 
tightening in the US interbank funding conditions is associated with an increase in the trading volume 
of most liquid stocks. Similar is the argument of Skjeltorp and Odegaard (2009), who find that trading 
activity in the Oslo Stock Exchange increased during the financial crisis only for the most liquid 
stocks. 
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The introduction of the slope dummy variable for the recent crisis period in model (6) 
has played a crucial role for our analysis. As a result, it is legitimate to ask how an alternative 
definition of the crisis period may affect the reported results. Admittedly, there is no 
universally accepted date for the end of the crisis. Some analysts even claim that the nature of 
the crisis is such that it is actually ongoing, being transmitted to different markets such as the 
sovereign debt market. Nevertheless, a possible candidate for an alternative end-of-crisis date 
is March 2009, i.e. when the major stock market indices experienced their lowest levels and 
since then they have rebounded to a great extent.15 Using this crisis period definition, we re-
estimate model (6), but now the slope dummy variable DCrisis  takes the value 1 during the 
period August 2007- March 2009 and 0 otherwise. 
Panel A of Table 7 contains the estimated returns’ response coefficients for the narrower 
definition of the crisis period pooling information from all ten liquidity portfolios constructed 
on the basis of the utilized measures. The panel estimation results are very similar to the ones 
obtained using the benchmark definition of the crisis period (see Panel B of Table 2). With 
the exception of trading volume-sorted portfolios, the inverse shocks-returns relationship 
before the crisis is confirmed. This evidence is highly statistically significant for 
unanticipated shocks. Most importantly, we confirm the reversal in the sign of this 
relationship during the crisis period. The economic as well as the statistical significance of 
the positive response of returns to interest rate shocks remains intact and robust to the 
narrower definition of the crisis period. 
[Table 7 about here] 
We further examine in Panel B of Table 7 the robustness of our results from model (6) 
using the most liquid- most illiquid portfolio return differential as its dependent variable. 
These should be compared with the results in Panel A of Table 6. Again, our findings are 
very robust to the alternative characterization of the crisis period. In particular, most liquid 
portfolios’ returns react more negatively than most illiquid portfolios’ returns to interest rate 
shocks before and after the crisis period. However, during the crisis period, most liquid 
portfolios’ returns react far more positively to these shocks relative to the most illiquid 
portfolios’ returns. This finding is highly statistically and economically significant.   
4.2. Additional control variables 
                                                            
15 Arguably, this is an ex post characterization of the end of the crisis, which was not universally 
accepted at that time. Our sole aim is to examine whether a narrower definition of the crisis period 
affects our results. 
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Our analysis has focused on the response of liquidity-sorted daily portfolios’ returns to 
macro-liquidity shocks. Despite the use of an event study methodology, arguably other 
factors may be driving our results. To take into account potentially omitted variables that may 
affect UK daily stock returns, we estimate the following augmented regression model: 
'
, 1 2( ) ( )
e e u u
p d d d d dr DCrisis i DCrisis i X eα β δ β δ γ= + + Δ + + Δ + +             (7) 
where dX  represents the vector of additional explanatory variables. Following Bredin et al. 
(2007), we consider as additional control variables the daily change in the sterling pound/ US 
dollar exchange rate, the corresponding change in the sterling pound/ Euro exchange rate as 
well as the return on the US market as proxied by the S&P 500 index.16 
Table 8 contains the response coefficients estimated from model (7). Panel A presents 
the results for the most liquid and most illiquid portfolios’ returns, while Panel B shows the 
corresponding results for the differential returns between these extreme decile portfolios.17 
We are able to confirm the robustness of our previous results, even in the presence of 
additional explanatory variables. There is a differential response to interest rate shocks 
between the most liquid and the most illiquid portfolios’ returns. This differential response is 
particularly significant, both statistically and economically, during the crisis period. More 
specifically, most liquid portfolios’ returns exhibited a highly positive reaction to macro-
liquidity shocks during the crisis, while most illiquid portfolios’ returns remained largely 
unaffected. 
[Table 8 about here] 
4.3. Alternative definition of macro-liquidity shocks 
This study has utilized macro-liquidity shocks defined relative to market expectations 
embedded in the traded futures contract written on the 3-month LIBOR. As mentioned in the 
Introduction, a series of related studies (see e.g. Nyborg and Ostberg, 2010) have utilized the 
innovations to the LIBOR-OIS spread as a measure of adverse funding conditions in the 
interbank market, and hence this spread can be regarded as a proxy of adverse macro-
                                                            
16 Given the time lag between the US and the UK market close, we follow common practice in the 
literature and use the lagged S&P 500 daily return. 
17 The estimated coefficients for the rest variables are not shown due to space limitations, but they are 
readily available upon request. We find that for almost all measures, portfolios’ returns, both illiquid 
and liquid, are significantly affected by lagged US stock returns. On the other hand, we find no 
statistical evidence that the changes in the bilateral exchange rate had an impact on these portfolios’ 
returns. 
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liquidity conditions. Therefore, in this subsection we seek to examine the response of the 
micro-liquidity sorted portfolios’ return to changes in the LIBOR-OIS spread. For the UK 
market, we define the equivalent spread as the difference between the 3-month LIBOR (L) 
and the BoE Base rate (B). The model we estimate is given by: 
, ( )p d d dr L B eα β= + Δ − +                 (8) 
where ( )dL BΔ −  stands for the change in the spread  on meeting day d over the previous 
trading day d-1. 
Figure 1 illustrates the values of this spread on the MPC meeting days for the period June 
1999- December 2009. An important feature of the LIBOR- Base rate spread is that it 
becomes very active mainly during the period we have characterized as the financial crisis 
period. In particular, this spread is almost zero for the most of our sample period and widens 
considerably only after August 2007. As a result, we do not need to introduce a crisis period 
slope dummy variable in model (8). This effect is inherently taken into account by the 
behaviour of the spread. We should stress that an increase in the spread on the MPC meeting 
day implies an adverse macro-liquidity shock, in the sense that funding conditions for 
financial intermediaries and market participants deteriorate, either through an increase in the 
cost of funds or through a reduction in their supply. Following Nyborg and Ostberg (2010), 
there is no decomposition between anticipated and unanticipated components of this 
innovation. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Table 9 presents the estimated response coefficients from model (8). Panel A contains 
the results for the most liquid and most illiquid portfolios’ returns respectively, while Panel B 
utilizes the liquid-illiquid decile portfolio differential return as the dependent variable. 
Overall, the results show a significantly different behaviour between the most liquid and most 
illiquid portfolios’ returns. In particular, we find that the returns of the most liquid portfolios 
exhibit a negative statistically as well as economically significant response to innovations in 
the LIBOR- Base rate spread. Moreover, this variable possesses very strong explanatory 
power with respect to liquid portfolios’ returns. The adjusted R2 of model (8) is as high as 
19% when turnover rate is used as a sorting liquidity measure. On the other hand, for most of 
the measures we considered, the most illiquid portfolios’ returns are largely unaffected by 
innovations in this spread. 
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[Table 9 about here] 
This evidence corroborates our previous finding that the most liquid portfolios’ returns 
are actually the ones that are mostly responsive to macro-liquidity shocks. Results in Panel B 
confirm that this differential behaviour is highly statistically significant. In line with our 
benchmark results, the returns of most liquid portfolios are much more heavily penalized, 
relative to the most illiquid portfolios’ returns, due to the adverse shock of an increase in the 
LIBOR-Base rate spread during the recent crisis period. The interpretation we put forward for 
this finding and is also supported using this alternative proxy of macro-liquidity shocks is that 
investors attempted to flee the stock market during this crisis period and mainly liquidated 
their positions in most liquid stocks, driving down their prices. It is likely that the flight to 
liquidity from the stock market to the money markets or even just cash holdings did not affect 
the most illiquid stocks either because these were too costly or difficult to liquidate 
(consistent with the conjecture of Brunnermeier, 2009, and the evidence provided by Anand, 
Irvine, Puckett and Venkataraman, 2010) or because they were already incorporating a 
significant liquidity premium, and hence they were trading at already low prices, rendering 
them worth withholding. 
 
5. Conclusions 
The recent global financial meltdown has brought macro-liquidity to the center stage of 
analysis for asset prices’ fluctuations and the stability of the financial system. This study 
examines the transmission of shocks affecting the funding liquidity conditions of market 
participants and financial intermediaries to stock market returns. In particular, we examine 
the potential link between macro-liquidity shocks and the returns of portfolios sorted on the 
basis of the shares’ micro-liquidity conditions. The focus of our event study analysis is on the 
shocks extracted relative to market expectations embedded in traded futures contracts on the 
Bank of England Monetary Policy Committee’s meeting days. 
There are three important conclusions from our empirical results. First, there has been a 
structural break in the relationship between macro-liquidity shocks and liquidity-sorted 
portfolio returns during the recent crisis period. Failing to account for this break, one would 
erroneously conclude that macro-liquidity shocks have no effect on returns. Second, these 
shocks are transmitted to the cross-section of liquidity-sorted portfolios but in a differential 
manner between the most liquid and the most illiquid portfolios; the effect is much more 
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statistically and economically significant for the most liquid portfolios. Third, the commonly 
documented inverse relationship between interest rate surprises and returns before the crisis 
has reversed its sign during the crisis. Interest rate cuts during the crisis not only failed to 
boost returns in the short-run, but they actually led liquid stocks to lower prices, because 
these were perceived by stock market participants as a signal of a worse economic outlook by 
the Bank of England. 
These empirical findings have several important implications for policy makers and 
market participants. The conventional wisdom that reducing interest rates can boost stock 
returns in the short-run does not necessarily hold during a severe crisis period. To the 
contrary, under such conditions, interest rate cuts may actually send the wrong signal to 
investors who may perceive them as a message that macroeconomic prospects are even worse 
than previously thought. This signalling effect may actually exacerbate the impact of adverse 
market conditions, eventually leading investors to flee the stock market, initializing a 
downward price spiral and posing a serious threat to the stability of the financial system. 
Moreover, the transmission of these macro-liquidity shocks may affect differentially stocks 
with different trading conditions. Therefore, dissecting the cross-section of stock returns can 
prove quite useful for portfolio selection and diversification due to their differential exposure 
to liquidity risk. This differential risk exposure may lead to differential premia and less 
correlated price movements. Last but not least, one should not neglect that the response of 
stock market participants to macro-liquidity shocks, especially during adverse market 
conditions, is bound to have spillover effects on trading conditions and prices in the money 
market and the bond market. This issue is left for future research. 
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Table 1 
 Descriptive Statistics and Correlations of Liquidity-sorted Portfolio Returns 
 
Panel A: Descriptive statistics 
 Most Liquid Portfolio  (P1) Most Illiquid Portfolio (P10) 
Liquidity measure Mean Median Max Min St. Dev. Mean Median Max Min St. Dev. 
Bid-Ask spread -0.11% -0.00% 4.05% -6.18% 1.68% -0.10% -0.02% 8.36% -4.72% 1.40% 
Relative spread -0.17% -0.06% 2.65% -5.77% 1.26% -0.08% 0.11% 6.78% -4.85% 1.27% 
Turnover Ratio -0.34% -0.25% 6.48% -10.1% 1.98% 0.03% 0.02% 9.40% -4.58% 1.26% 
Volume -0.18% -0.08% 2.75% -5.94% 1.38% -0.01% 0.07% 2.96% -5.54% 0.75% 
RtoV Ratio -0.18% -0.09% 2.69% -5.74% 1.28% 0.05% 0.12% 2.83% -3.43% 0.90% 
RtoTR Ratio -0.23% -0.11% 3.09% -5.50% 1.28% -0.04% 0.03% 5.10% -3.13% 1.05% 
 
Panel B: Correlation Coefficients 
 Most Liquid Portfolios (P1) Most Illiquid Portfolios (P10) 
Liquidity measure 1 2 3 4 5 6 1 2 3 4 5 6 
1. Bid-Ask spread 1      1      
2. Relative spread 0.85 1     0.65 1     
3. Turnover Ratio 0.78 0.82 1    0.67 0.65 1    
4. Volume 0.87 0.99 0.85 1   0.35 0.46 0.47 1   
5. RtoV Ratio 0.87 0.99 0.85 0.99 1  0.50 0.54 0.55 0.74 1  
6. RtoTR Ratio 0.79 0.91 0.84 0.92 0.919 1 0.67 0.63 0.79 0.53 0.68 1 
 
Notes: This Table presents descriptive statistics (Panel A) and correlation coefficients (Panel B) of liquidity-sorted portfolios’ returns on the Bank of England (BoE) 
Monetary Policy Committee’s (MPC) meeting days. The analysis covers the period June 1999 to December 2009 (128 MPC meeting days). Statistics are reported 
separately for the portfolio containing the most liquid stocks (P1) and the portfolio containing the most illiquid stocks (P10), constructed on the basis of six measures 
of microstructure liquidity: Bid-Ask spread, Relative spread, Turnover Ratio, Volume, RtoV Ratio and RtoTR ratio. Analytical definitions for these measures are 
provided in Section 2.  
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Table 2 
The Response of Liquidity-sorted Portfolios’ Returns to Interest Rate Changes (Pooled) 
 
Panel A: Benchmark Specification 
Liquidity measure Δite (Expected) Δitu  (Unexpected) R2 adj. 
1. Bid-Ask spread -1.46 2.26** 0.03 
2. Relative spread -1.10 0.67 0.01 
3. Turnover Ratio -1.38 1.03 0.01 
4. Volume 0.24 0.97 0.00 
5. RtoV Ratio 0.04 0.90 0.00 
6. RtoTR Ratio -1.57 0.69 0.01 
 
Panel B: The Effect of the Crisis 
Liquidity measure Δite Crisis* Δite Δitu Crisis* Δitu R2 adj. 
1. Bid-Ask spread -5.86*** 15.35*** -4.53*** 20.00*** 0.11 
2. Relative spread -3.40*** 8.19*** -3.54*** 11.97*** 0.04 
3. Turnover Ratio -4.34*** 10.11*** -3.63*** 13.47*** 0.05 
4. Volume -1.12 4.72*** -1.24 6.48*** 0.02 
5. RtoV Ratio -1.75** 6.27*** -2.08** 8.67*** 0.03 
6. RtoTR Ratio -4.90*** 11.44*** -4.30*** 14.78*** 0.05 
Notes: This Table presents results from pooled least squares panel regressions of daily returns 
of liquidity-sorted portfolios (P1 to P10) on the expected and unexpected changes in LIBOR on 
BoE Monetary Policy Committee’s (MPC) meeting days. GLS cross-section weights have been 
used to account for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity. The analysis is conducted for six 
liquidity measures and covers the period June 1999 to December 2009 (128 meetings). Panel A 
reports the estimated coefficients of our benchmark model: ,
e e u u
p d d d dr i i eα β β= + Δ + Δ +   (5), 
where ,p dr  is the return of the liquidity portfolio p on the meeting day d, 
e
diΔ is the expected 
change in the interest rate and udiΔ is the unexpected change in the interest rate.Panel B reports 
the estimated coefficients of a model that introduces a crisis period dummy variable: 
, 1 2( ) ( )
e e u u
p d d d dr DCrisis i DCrisis i eα β δ β δ= + + Δ + + Δ +  (6), where DCrisis is a dummy 
variable that takes the value of 1 over the period August 2007-December 2009, and 0 otherwise 
(see Section 2 for details).  ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, 
respectively. 
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Table 3 
The Response of Most Liquid and Illiquid Portfolios’ Returns to Interest Rate Changes  
 
 
Most Liquid Portfolio (P1) 
 
Most Illiquid Portfolio (P10) 
Liquidity measure Δite Δitu R2 adj. Δite Δitu R2 adj. 
1. Bid-Ask spread 0.46 2.71 0.00 -4.00 -3.16 0.00 
2. Relative spread -1.55 2.83 0.04 1.87 3.08 0.00 
3. Turnover Ratio 3.42 8.43 0.03 0.25 -1.98 0.00 
4. Volume -1.33 3.03 0.03 -1.04 -0.67 0.00 
5. RtoV Ratio -1.34 2.93 0.04 1.56 0.43 0.00 
6. RtoTR Ratio -0.40 2.60 0.01 0.04 -1.33 0.00 
Notes: This Table presents results from least squares regressions of daily returns of the most liquid (P1) 
and most illiquid (P10) portfolios on the expected and unexpected changes in LIBOR on BoE Monetary 
Policy Committee’s (MPC) meeting days. The robust standard errors of Newey and West (1987) have 
been utilised. The analysis is conducted for six liquidity measures and covers the period June 1999 to 
December 2009 (128 MPC meetings). We provide the estimated coefficients of our benchmark model: 
,
e e u u
p d d d dr i i eα β β= + Δ + Δ +   (5), where ,p dr  is the return of the liquidity portfolio p on the meeting 
day d, ediΔ is the expected change in the interest rate and udiΔ is the unexpected change in the interest. 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 4 
The Response of Most Liquid and Illiquid Portfolios’ Returns to Interest Rate Changes: The Effect of the Crisis 
 
Panel A: The Effect of the Crisis 
 Most Liquid Portfolio (P1) Most Illiquid Portfolio (P10) 
Liquidity measure Δite Crisis* Δite Δitu Crisis* Δitu R2 adj. Δite Crisis* Δite Δitu Crisis* Δitu R2 adj. 
1. Bid-Ask spread -7.18** 25.55*** -6.63** 28.62*** 0.08 -4.68 2.56 -5.10* 5.04 0.00 
2. Relative spread -6.59*** 17.39*** -5.35* 23.44*** 0.15 4.12 -6.42 1.65 1.06 0.02 
3. Turnover Ratio -8.70** 40.95*** -8.02** 49.07*** 0.22 0.81 -1.50 -2.64 0.95 0.00 
4. Volume -6.88*** 19.02*** -5.63** 25.02*** 0.15 -0.14 -2.87 -0.12 -2.13 0.00 
5. RtoV Ratio -6.62*** 18.12*** -5.40* 23.99*** 0.15 2.02 -1.50 0.81 -1.31 0.00 
6. RtoTR Ratio -5.39** 16.99*** -4.71 21.42*** 0.09 -0.11 0.56 -1.80 1.21 0.00 
 
Panel B: The Effect of the Crisis and Controlling for Large Outliers 
 Most Liquid Portfolio (P1) Most Illiquid Portfolio (P10) 
Liquidity measure Δite Crisis* Δite Δitu Crisis* Δitu R2 adj. Δite Crisis* Δite Δitu Crisis* Δitu R2 adj. 
1. Bid-Ask spread -8.18*** 22.36*** -7.95*** 27.03*** 0.27 -6.40** 4.07 -4.87** 4.63* 0.37 
2. Relative spread -7.20*** 12.10*** -6.12** 9.39** 0.44 -1.32 4.01 -0.88 6.51** 0.61 
3. Turnover Ratio -8.75** 25.15*** -8.09** 30.52*** 0.43 -0.11 3.15 -0.71 1.08 0.59 
4. Volume -7.52*** 14.00*** -6.44** 11.58*** 0.41 0.02 2.53 0.14 1.19 0.62 
5. RtoV Ratio -7.26*** 13.15*** -6.21** 10.68*** 0.42 0.30 3.87 -1.34 3.44 0.50 
6. RtoTR Ratio -6.10*** 11.94*** -5.61* 7.78** 0.40 -1.86 2.19 -2.45 1.76 0.23 
Notes: This Table presents results from least squares regressions of daily returns of the most liquid (P1) and most illiquid (P10) portfolios on the expected and 
unexpected changes in LIBOR on BoE Monetary Policy Committee’s (MPC) meeting days. The robust standard errors of Newey and West (1987) have been utilised. 
The analysis is conducted for six liquidity measures and covers the period June 1999 to December 2009 (128 MPC meetings). Panel A reports the estimated 
coefficients of the model: , 1 2( ) ( )
e e u u
p d d d dr DCrisis i DCrisis i eα β δ β δ= + + Δ + + Δ +  (6), where ,p dr  is the return of the liquidity portfolio p on the meeting day d, 
e
diΔ is the expected change in the interest rate, udiΔ is the unexpected change in the interest rate and DCrisis is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 over the 
period August 2007-December 2009, and 0 otherwise. In Panel B we re-estimate model (6) and report the estimated coefficients after controlling for the impact of 
large outliers. ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 5 
 The Response of Portfolio Differential Returns (P1-P10) to Interest Rate Changes 
 
 
Most Liquid- Most Illiquid Portfolio Differential (P1-P10) 
Liquidity measure Δite      Δitu           R2 adj. 
1. Bid-Ask spread 4.46 5.87 0.00 
2. Relative spread -3.42 -0.25 0.02 
3. Turnover Ratio 3.17 10.41 0.06 
4. Volume -0.29 3.71 0.03 
5. RtoV Ratio -2.90 2.50 0.07 
6. RtoTR Ratio -0.44 3.93 0.04 
Notes: This Table presents results from least squares regressions of differential returns 
between the most liquid and the most illiquid portfolio (P1-P10) on the expected and 
unexpected changes in LIBOR on BoE Monetary Policy Committee’s (MPC) meeting 
days. The robust standard errors of Newey and West (1987) have been utilised. The 
analysis is conducted for six liquidity measures and covers the period June 1999 to 
December 2009 (128 MPC meetings). We report the estimated coefficients of the model: 
e e u u
d d d dr i i eα β β= + Δ + Δ +   (5), where ,p dr  is the return of the most liquid- most 
illiquid decile portfolio differential (P1-P10) on the meeting day d, ediΔ is the expected 
change in the interest rate and udiΔ is the unexpected change in the interest rate. ***, **, 
* indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 6 
The Response of Portfolio Differential Returns (P1-P10) to Interest Rate Changes: 
The Effect of the Crisis 
 
Panel A: The Effect of the Crisis 
Liquidity measure Δite Crisis* Δite Δitu Crisis* Δitu R2 adj. 
1. Bid-Ask spread -2.51 22.99*** -1.54 23.58*** 0.06 
2. Relative spread -10.71** 23.80*** -6.99* 22.38*** 0.13 
3. Turnover Ratio -9.51*** 42.45*** -5.38* 48.13*** 0.24 
4. Volume -6.73*** 21.89*** -5.51** 27.15*** 0.18 
5. RtoV Ratio -8.64*** 19.62*** -6.21** 25.31*** 0.19 
6. RtoTR Ratio -5.28* 16.43*** -2.91 20.21*** 0.11 
 
Panel B: The Effect of the Crisis and Controlling for Large Outliers 
Liquidity measure Δite Crisis* Δite Δitu Crisis* Δitu R2 adj. 
1. Bid-Ask spread  -1.11 16.64*** -1.26 19.75*** 0.44 
2. Relative spread -6.44*** 19.59*** -5.74*** 21.17*** 0.40 
3. Turnover Ratio -8.54*** 23.35*** -6.40* 25.77*** 0.42 
4. Volume -7.47*** 22.85*** -6.49*** 28.32*** 0.28 
5. RtoV Ratio -9.40*** 20.55*** -7.23*** 26.15*** 0.33 
6. RtoTR Ratio -6.26** 17.47*** -4.22 21.58*** 0.31 
Notes: This Table presents results from least squares regressions of portfolio differential returns 
between the most liquid and the most illiquid portfolio (P1-P10) on the expected and unexpected 
changes in LIBOR on BoE Monetary Policy Committee’s (MPC) meeting days. The robust standard 
errors of Newey and West (1987) have been utilised. The analysis is conducted for six liquidity 
measures and covers the period June 1999 to December 2009 (128 meetings). Panel A reports the 
estimated coefficients of following model: , 1 2( ) ( )
e e u u
p d d d dr DCrisis i DCrisis i eα β δ β δ= + + Δ + + Δ +  
(6), where ,p dr  is the return of the most liquid- most illiquid decile portfolio differential (P1-P10) on 
the meeting day d, ediΔ is the expected change in the interest rate, udiΔ is the unexpected change in 
the interest rate and DCrisis is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 over the period August 
2007-December 2009, and 0 otherwise. In Panel B we re-estimate model (6) and report the 
estimated coefficients after controlling for the impact of large outliers. ***, **, * indicate statistical 
significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively.  
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Table 7  
The Response of Portfolio Returns to Interest Rate Changes under a  
Narrower Crisis Period Definition 
 
Panel A: Pooled estimates based on all ten portfolios (P1 to P10)  
Liquidity measure Δite Crisis* Δite Δitu Crisis* Δitu R2 adj. 
1. Bid-Ask spread -4.58*** 12.02*** -4.37*** 19.23*** 0.11 
2. Relative spread -2.33** 5.02*** -3.66*** 11.55*** 0.06 
3. Turnover Ratio -2.97*** 6.05*** -3.54*** 12.32*** 0.05 
4. Volume -0.33 2.36* -1.46* 6.39*** 0.03 
5. RtoV Ratio -0.92 3.85*** -2.37** 8.79*** 0.04 
6. RtoTR Ratio -3.38*** 7.04*** -4.27*** 13.72*** 0.05 
 
Panel B: Most Liquid- Most Illiquid Portfolio Differential (P1-P10) 
Liquidity measure Δite Crisis* Δite Δitu Crisis* Δitu R2 adj. 
1. Bid-Ask spread -0.15 16.76*** -0.36 19.80*** 0.03 
2. Relative spread -9.14** 20.55*** -6.20* 20.50*** 0.10 
3. Turnover Ratio -6.76 36.31*** -4.17 45.26*** 0.21 
4. Volume -5.55** 19.35*** -4.87* 25.90*** 0.17 
5. RtoV Ratio -7.71*** 17.71*** -5.29* 23.57*** 0.17 
6. RtoTR Ratio -4.42 14.57*** -2.04 18.43*** 0.09 
Notes: This Table presents results on the impact of interest rate changes on liquidity-sorted portfolios 
(Panel A) and Portfolio Differentials (Panel B) after using a narrower definition of the crisis period 
(August 2007- March 2009). Portfolios are sorted on the basis of the six liquidity measures 
considered. In particular, Panel A reports pooled least squares panel estimates of the following model: 
, 1 2( ) ( )
e e u u
p d d d dr DCrisis i DCrisis i eα β δ β δ= + + Δ + + Δ +  (6), where ,p dr  is the return of the liquidity 
portfolio p on the meeting day d, ediΔ is the expected change in the interest rate, udiΔ is the 
unexpected change in the interest rate and DCrisis is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 over 
the period August 2007-March 2009, and 0 otherwise. GLS cross-section weights have been used to 
account for cross-sectional heteroskedasticity. Panel B reports least squares estimation results (with 
robust standard errors). In Panel B, ,p dr  is the return of the most liquid- most illiquid decile portfolio 
differential (P1-P10) on the meeting day d.  ***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 
10% level, respectively. 
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Table 8: The Impact of Interest Rate Changes on Portfolio Returns using other Control Variables 
 
 
Panel A: Extreme Deciles 
 Most Liquid Portfolio (P1) Most Illiquid Portfolio (P10) 
Liquidity measure Δite Crisis* Δite Δitu Crisis* Δitu R2 adj. Δite Crisis* Δite Δitu Crisis* Δitu R2 adj. 
1. Bid-Ask spread -7.68** 25.41*** -8.52** 27.34*** 0.09 -5.28* 3.36 -6.75** 2.45 0.09 
2. Relative spread -7.23*** 17.35*** -7.61*** 21.52*** 0.24 3.49 -6.35 -0.57 -0.80 0.11 
3. Turnover Ratio -9.49*** 41.14*** -10.66*** 46.37*** 0.28 0.16 -1.08 -4.53 -1.78 0.11 
4. Volume -7.51*** 18.93*** -7.82*** 22.97*** 0.23 -0.68 -2.43 -1.81 -4.00* 0.25 
5. RtoV Ratio -7.24*** 18.03*** -7.59*** 22.02*** 0.22 1.48 -0.68 -0.50 -3.95* 0.23 
6. RtoTR Ratio -5.96*** 17.52*** -6.50** 19.44*** 0.19 -0.60 1.33 -2.64 -2.09 0.13 
 
 
Panel B: Most Liquid- Most Illiquid Portfolio Differential (P1-P10)  
Liquidity measure Δite Crisis* Δite Δitu Crisis* Δitu R2 adj.      
1. Bid-Ask spread -2.40 22.05*** -1.77 24.89*** 0.06      
2. Relative spread -10.72** 23.70*** -7.03* 22.32*** 0.11      
3. Turnover Ratio -9.65*** 42.22*** -6.14* 48.15*** 0.22      
4. Volume -6.83*** 21.36*** -6.01** 26.97*** 0.17      
5. RtoV Ratio -8.72*** 18.71*** -7.09** 25.97*** 0.19      
6. RtoTR Ratio -5.35* 16.19*** -3.86 21.53*** 0.10      
Notes: This Table presents least squares results (with robust standard errors) on the impact of interest rate changes on the returns of the most liquid (P1) and most 
illiquid (P10) portfolios (Panel A) and differential returns between the most liquid and the most illiquid portfolio (P1-P10) (Panel B). The analysis involves daily 
returns calculated on the BoE Monetary Policy Committee’s (MPC) meeting days and covers the period  June 1999 to December 2009 (128 MPC meetings). In 
particular, Panel A reports the estimated coefficients of the model: ', 1 2( ) ( )
e e u u
p d d d d dr DCrisis i DCrisis i X eα β δ β δ γ= + + Δ + + Δ + +  (7), where ,p dr  is the return of 
portfolio P1 or portfolio P10 on the meeting day d, ediΔ is the expected change in the interest rate, udiΔ is the unexpected change in the interest rate, DCrisis is a 
dummy variable that takes the value of 1 over the period August 2007-December 2009, and 0 otherwise, and dX  represents the vector of additional explanatory 
variables such as the sterling pound/ US dollar exchange rate, the corresponding change in the sterling pound/ Euro exchange rate as well as the lagged return on the 
US market, as proxied by the S&P 500 index. In Panel B, ,p dr  is the return of the most liquid- most illiquid decile portfolio differential (P1-P10)  ***, **, * indicate 
statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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Table 9 
The Response of Portfolio Returns to changes in the LIBOR-BoE base rate spread  
 
                                Panel A: Extreme deciles 
 Most Liquid Portfolio (P1) Most Illiquid Portfolio (P10) 
Liquidity measure Δ(L-B) R2 adj. Δ(L-B) R2 adj. 
Bid-Ask spread -2.79*** 0.10 -0.25 0.00 
Relative spread -2.47*** 0.14 -0.53 0.00 
Turnover Ratio -4.42*** 0.19 0.04 0.00 
Volume -2.55*** 0.14 -0.82** 0.04 
RtoV Ratio -2.48*** 0.14 -0.66*** 0.01 
RtoTR Ratio -2.56*** 0.15 -0.45 0.00 
 
Panel B: Most Liquid- Most Illiquid Portfolio Differential (P1-P10) 
Liquidity measure Δ(L-B) R2 adj.  
Bid-Ask spread -2.54*** 0.08 
Relative spread -1.94*** 0.08 
Turnover Ratio -4.46*** 0.18 
Volume -1.74*** 0.07 
RtoV Ratio -1.82** 0.07 
RtoTR Ratio -2.11*** 0.10 
 
Notes: This table reports the least squares results (with robust standard errors) of the 
impact of changes in the LIBOR-BoE base rate spread (two week repo rate) on the daily 
returns of the most liquid (P1) and most illiquid (P10) portfolios (Panel A) and 
differential returns between the most liquid and the most illiquid portfolio (P1-P10) 
(Panel B). The analysis involves daily returns calculated on the BoE Monetary Policy 
Committee’s (MPC) meeting days and covers the period  June 1999 to December 2009 
(128 MPC meetings). The LIBOR-BoE base rate spread is defined for the UK market as 
the difference between the 3-month LIBOR (L) and the BoE Base rate (B). We report the 
estimated coefficients of the model: , ( )p d d dr L B eα β= + Δ − +  , (8) where ( )dL BΔ −  
stands for the change in the spread on meeting day d over the previous trading day d-1. 
***, **, * indicate statistical significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level, respectively. 
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Figure 1 
 
 
Notes: This Figure shows the spread between the 3-month LIBOR and the Base rate (two week repo rate) of the Bank of England (BoE) on BoE’s Monetary 
Policy Committee meetings days. These meetings days cover the period from June 1999 to December 2009, yielding a total of 128 observations. 
